股票發行市場是企業籌募資金重要的管道，然而由於資訊不對稱的問題，使新上市股票產生折價，這種折價的情形，讓舊股東不易在新股上市時、或上市後短時間內出脫持股，以避免增加資訊不對稱的負面影響。這種因資訊不對稱減低舊股東持股的流通性，一方面增加舊股東的機會成本。另一方面，當舊股東售股而使折價幅度加大，無異於提高發行公司的資金成本。因此，如何減低資訊不對稱，降低發行成本便成為一項重要的課題。本文認為信譽是克服資訊不對稱有效的方法。因為信譽所賺取的準租會因遭受質疑而毫無殘值，亦即愈有信譽的舊股東，其信譽有瑕疵的代價較高，較不會有投機的行為。投資者從而對他們的售股行為較不會有負面的反應。舊股東基於財富最大化的理由，在繼續持股的機會成本與折價售股中，選擇兩者損失較低者。因此，假如信譽能減低資訊不對稱的問題，那麼有信譽的舊股東因其售股時的折價損失較小，自然較有可能在新股上市時出脫其持股。本文亦推論有信譽的第三者對新上市股價值的認證，也可以幫助舊股東在新股上市時出售其持股。

New equity offering is an important source for business to raise capital. However, information asymmetry in new equity offering can cause outside investors react negatively to existing shareholders selling in an offering. The negative reaction can raise the effective cost of insider selling and discourage them from selling. Such a negative market reaction caused by information asymmetry not only reduce the liquidity of existing shareholders, but also insider selling implies an increase of cost for an enterprise to raise capital. These concerns motivate existing shareholders to establish a reputation of dealing fairly with outsiders. The reputation serves as an effective bond to convince outsiders that existing shareholders will not behave opportunistically when the present value of their reputational quasi-rents exceeds the one-time wealth transfer from the sale of shares. Existing shareholders trade off the opportunity cost of holding the shares and the price discount in the offering if they sell. Since reputable insiders can reduce the negative market reaction, the costs arise from selling shares will be lower. Therefore, reputable insiders are expected to be more likely to sell shares than nonreputable ones. In addition, a reputable third-party may be a substitute and/or a complement to facilitate insiders unwind their positions.