過去有關CEO 接班的研究相當豐富，然而在已發展的西方國家之外，卻 很少有類似的研究。本研究以198 個台灣上市公司為樣本，運用二十一年的資 料(1 981-2001)，探討CEO更迭、CEO任期與董事會的關係，試圖增加學 術界或企業界對東亞國家公司治理研究的理解。本研究發現CEO的相對權力 顯著影響CEO更迭與其任期，當CEO 與公司最大家族具有親屬連帶關係時， CEO 接任的比例降低，CEO的任期也較長；另一方面，當家族擁有有效掌控 公司的所有權時，CEO 接任的比例也較低，CEO 的任期較長。此外，本研究 結果顯示公司過去經營績效與CEO 更換比率呈顯著負向關係，與CEO任期則 為正向關係，然上述關係受CEO權力與是否公司存有控制家族兩項因素的調 節。

The literature on CEO succession is quite rich and varied given a very long research tradition in the west. However, little is known about the determinants of CEO succession in countries outside the developed western world. In attempting to fill this gap, this study, set in Taiwan, examines the relationship between the turnover and tenure of CEO and the board of directors, using a longitudinal data set on 198 Taiwan public traded corporations over a 21-year period (1981-2001). The findings indicate that the CEO's relative power plays an important role in Explaining variations in CEO turnover and the duration of tenure. When the CEO acquires more power through kinship tie with the largest family or the family with effective control power through ownership, the CEO turnover is significantly lower and the tenure is longer. The paper also investigates if poor firm performance may trigger the replacement and decrease tenure of CEO. The results show that the corporate performance is strong negatively related to the CEO turnover and positively related to the tenure; furthermore the relationship is moderated by CEO power and the presence of a controlling family shareholder.

With the increasing importance of the business sector in developing countries, like Taiwan, study of the corporate governance structure should be one of the most important research topics. Most studies of family business in Taiwan focus on fiscal issues and the proportion of shares that families actually control. Few have investigated the relational structures among board members and executives. These relational structures, however, are the keys to understanding the nature of Taiwanese businesses, since relationship (guanxi) is a dominant determinant in many important business decisions. Using a longitudinal data set on 198 Taiwan public traded corporations over a 21-year period (1981-2001), this study examines the relationship among CEO turnover, tenure, CEO power, and firm performance. The findings indicate that even though family control through family members serving as board members and senior managers has been gradually decreasing in Taiwan, our empirical results still show that when the CEO acquires more power through kinship tie with the largest family or the family with absolute control power, the CEO turnover is significantly lower and the tenure is longer. In addition, the results find that if the CEO is not a member of the controlling family, the performance requirements may be relatively strict. These results suggest that controlling families may be willing to sacrifice some degree of corporate profitability in order to retain higher degree of family control over the corporation. Thus, in the case of family-controlled corporations, direct control of the firm by a family member may become an important goal. These empirical results from familial and equity data may provide an interesting perspective on a much debated governance issue.