我國於2006年5月24日修正商業會計法，並於2007年8月23日制定第39號公報「股份基礎給付之會計處理準則」，規範企業員工酬勞（含員工分紅與員工認股選擇權等）之相關會計處理。從2008年1月1日開始，企業發放之員工分紅及員工認股選擇權等酬勞一律按公允價值費用化處理。然而，第39號公報卻容許公司於草案發布日到2007年12月31日過渡期間所發行之員工認股權，於未來既得期間（即2008年以後）仍不需按公允價值費用化，造成員工分紅與員工認股權之會計效果不同，亦造成許多公司利用該過渡期間發放員工認股選擇權。因公司經理人薪酬之發放主要由董事會決定，故本研究利用此特定期間實際情況，探討董事會特性如何影響員工認股權之發放，並探討其盈餘資訊性後果。 本文以董事會成員股權結構、獨立性、專業程度及參與程度作為衡量董事會功能的綜合指標，實證結果顯示，董事會功能較能發揮的公司，在2007年第39號公報過渡期間發放員工認股選擇權的可能性較低。我們也進一步發現，平均而言，在2007年發放員工認股權的公司，對盈餘資訊性並無顯著影響，但若公司董事會功能得以發揮，在2007年發放員工認股權會提高其盈餘資訊性，顯示董事會有效性在2007年發放員工認股權之決策扮演重要角色。

A firm should recognize payments of employee bonus and employee stock option as an expense and measured by fair market value after January 1, 2008 based on the revision of Article 64 of the Business Accounting Law and the adoption of Taiwan FAS39. Firms with payments of employee stock option in the transition period of FAS39 may have higher incentive of opportunistic earnings management. The determinant and consequence of granting employee stock option in the transition period is an important issue. This paper uses the data of listed firms in year 2007 to examine the relationship between board characteristics and the grant of employee stock option. The effectiveness of the board is measured by board characteristics including the ownership structure, board independence, expertise and attendance. This research first investigates whether board characteristics influence the payment of employee stock option (ESO) in the transition period of FAS39 (year 2007), and further examines the effect of ESO on earnings informativeness in the transition period. Empirical results show that the positive board characteristics reduce the likelihood of employee stock option issuance during the transition period. This research also finds that the result of the effect of ESO on earnings informativeness is insignificant, but the earnings informativeness is increased when firms have strong board during the transition period.

為與國際財務報導準則（International Financial Reporting Standards，IFRS）趨同，台灣自2005年開始，陸續針對員工獎酬之會計準則進行修正。過去之研究發現，許多公司利用新舊會計原則採行之過渡時期，進行對公司有利之盈餘管理或報表操弄。在此提升公司治理之時期，董事會在新舊會計準則過渡期間，所扮演的角色之了解與改變顯得更為重要。本文以第39號公報「股份基礎給付之會計處理準則」草案發布日至實施日之過渡期，公司是否發行員工認股權，及其所造成財務會計效果之差異為主要研究對象，探討公司董事會組成在公報改變的過渡時間所扮演之角色。本研究利用此特定期間實際情況，探討董事會特性如何影響員工認股權之發放，並探討其盈餘資訊性後果，期能對相關學術文獻有所貢獻，並有助於公司治理政策之改進與新會計準則採用過渡期間之選擇提供實證參考資訊。 本文以董事會成員股權結構、獨立性、專業程度及參與程度作為衡量董事會功能的綜合指標，實證結果顯示，董事會功能較能發揮的公司，在2007年第39號公報過渡期間發放員工認股選擇權的可能性較低。我們也進一步發現，董事會有效性在2007年發放員工認股權之決策扮演重要角色。本研究利用我國財務會計準則第39號公報提供實施過渡期間之機會，針對新舊會計準則會計處理差異可能造成財務報導之不同及公司管理當局之投機行為等議題探討，提供主管機關未來制定相關會計準則規定時，如何規定過渡期間之會計處理之實證參考資料。此外，有別於過去相關研究多數探討在準則過渡時期公司的投機性財務報導行為，本研究進一步以過渡時期之員工認股權發放為主要探討對象，可提供會計實務及管理當局不同面向之管理意涵。本文除探討準則過渡時期公司可能進行之投機行為外，亦以企業利害關係人的觀點，提供市場可能對不同特質公司的同一交易給予不同評價之實證資料。研究結果顯示，公司管理當局在新會計準則採行之過渡時期，財務政策制定或新舊原則適用之選擇時，亦應考量其可能造成之市場反應及經濟後果。

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