此文探討大陸銀行為何特權消費高，特權消費與銀行績效間有何關聯，以及甚麼機制可有效監督特權消費。研究結果顯示CEO權力大，CEO有政治關聯，大銀行，老銀行的特權消費比較高。雖然我們沒發現特權消費與職位鞏固之間有明顯的關聯，但特權消費高的銀行績效較差，且特權消費與績效間的關係在特別強調地位的銀行(如大銀行，CEO權力大的銀行)中更明顯。特權消費高的銀行風險承擔程度也比較高，這樣的銀行比較會從事績效波動高的相關活動。在高特權消費的銀行，董事會多元性較低，但董事會專業性卻比較高。在高特權消費的銀行中，無相關業務經驗的董事較少，較少女性董事，董事平均年齡較老。在高特權消費銀行，普遍存在的大規模董事會，與高學歷、具學術背景的董事，這些都無法有效監督特權消費，唯有性別多元化的董事會才能有效監督特權消費。

This paper investigates why perks are high, how perks are related to bank performance, and which monitoring function works in the Chinese banking sector. Results show that stronger CEO power, CEOs with political ties, larger banks, and older banks are all associated with higher perks. Although we are unable to find a significant relationship between perks and entrenchment, banks with high perks underperform versus those with low perks. The relationship between perks and performance is more pronounced for banks that are prone to emphasize status, such as large banks and banks with high CEO power. Banks with high perks are also associated with high risk-taking and are more likely to be engaged in events that have a high variability of performance. Boards of directors in high-perk banks are less diversified, but surprisingly, more professional. Evidence also presents that fewer directors with unaffiliated business experience, fewer female directors, and older directors serve on the boards of high-perk banks. Large boards and directors with a higher education or academic background, which are common in high-perk banks, fail to efficiently monitor perks. Gender-diverse boards provide better monitoring.

Perks reflect wasteful corporate practices such as lax management and overinvestment. Banks with high perks underperform those with low perks in many ways, such as performance, risk-taking, and variability of performance. Perks hidden in accounting notes, not to mention banks whose annual reports are unavailable, are hard to observe by outsiders. Information disclosure on perk consumptions could be the first step to reduce inefficient perks. We suggest more regulations to enforce the disclosure of perk consumptions. Before this occurs, investors can take notice of large or old banks and banks with strong CEO power or with politically-connected CEOs, which are more likely to have high perk consumptions. Although perks are hard for outsiders to observe and monitor, investors can try and rely on diversified board members to provide effective monitoring. When director members are being recruited, as Leung (2015) suggests, a board should consider factors like age, race, gender, educational background and professional qualifications, which would make the board less homogenous.

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