Department of Business Administration, National Taiwan University; Graduate School of Resources Management & Decision Science, Management College, National Defense University; Department of International Business, National Taiwan University; Corporate Strategy and Development Office, Far Eastone Telecommunications Co., Ltd.
股權結構、董事會特性與公司績效之關係，為當代組織策略學者廣泛討論之議題。現有文獻中，股權集中度與董事年資對於公司績效到底有正向或負向的影響，卻有不一致的研究結果。本研究實證探討股權結構（包括大股東股權集中度、外部法人持股）與外部董事年資對公司績效之影響，採用2011至2013年台灣708家上市公司的三年期資料。研究結果發現，大股東股權集中度與公司績效之間並非現有文獻主張的單純線性關係，而是先升後降的倒U型曲線關係；同樣地，外部法人持股比例與外部董事年資，對於公司績效同樣存在先升後降的倒U型曲線關係。本研究的結果對於過往學術研究的不一致結論，提供了可能的學術解釋。(144_M5d82fd2da5d52_Abs.pdf(File does not exist))
The relationship between ownership structure, board composition and firm performance has been an increasingly important topic in organization and strategy research. Regarding whether shareholding concentration and director tenure have a positive or negative impact on firm performance, existing literature however reports inconsistent findings. This study empirically examines how shareholding structure (specifically, large shareholding and institutional shareholding) and outside director tenure influence firm performance, by using data collected from 708 Taiwanese public firms during the period of 2011-2013. The results show that large shareholding, institutional shareholding and outside director tenure influence firm performance in a nonlinear manner. Their influences are positive in the beginning and turn into negative when going beyond a certain degree, suggesting an inverted U-shaped relationship. Findings of this study are expected to shed new lights on the inconsistent findings of prior academic studies.(144_M5d82fd2da5d52_Abs.pdf(File does not exist))
Large Shareholding, Institutional Shareholding, Outside Director Tenure, Firm Performance
根據OECD公司治理原則，企業能真正保障股東權益者，可謂具有創業家精神。近年美國的恩隆案、台灣的力霸掏空案等，傷害的是所有利害關係人之權益，更讓落實股東權益保障的議題更顯重要。 過去半世紀以來學者根據代理理論探討公司治理機制，現有學術文獻指出，當經理人追求的利益與股東不相同時，會導致傳統的型一代理問題，故建議增加股東力量以有效監督經理人做出有利股東之決策；但當大股東股權集中度過高時，大股東也可能豪奪小股東之利益，造成大小股東之間的代理問題，亦即型二代理問題。換言之，為了避免型一代理問題，公司致力於擴大股東力量，反倒可能衍生出型二代理問題。此外，增加外部股東的監視力量，也是解決代理問題的可能方式之一，但若持續擴大外部股東股權又可能稀釋大股東權益，失去與經理人相抗衡之優勢，如此又回到型一代理問題。此時，若能引進外部董事以強化董事會的監督功能，也可能降低型一與型二代理問題。因此，如何設計平衡的股權結構並健全董事會之機制，實為提升公司經營績效的重要議題。 本研究以台灣上市公司為研究對象，提出企業應同時考慮大股東股權集中度、外部法人持股、外部董事年資等公司治理機制。本研究發現這三種公司治理機制對於公司績效均呈現顯著的倒U型效果，意味著這些公司治理機制對公司績效存在某個最適的決策點。公司高層必須注意大股東與外部股東持股比例的結構變化，方能真正透過股權結構來激勵其發揮監督治理之功能，以避免力量過小或過大時對公司績效之不良影響。公司也必須注意外部董事的任期年資，異動頻繁可能隱含該公司功能不健全，而萬年董事又可能喪失監督功能，因此公司應適時調整以確保董事會的監督品質，以提升經營績效。這和金管會於2017年研擬修法，獨立董事任期若超過三屆則必須揭露的規範相當一致。本研究的發現和當代公司治理實務互相呼應，提供學術界、企業界、政府相關單位具體的參考依據。
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