中山管理評論

  期刊全文閱覽

中山管理評論  2017/6

第25卷第2期  p.367-398

DOI:10.6160/2017.06.03


題目
董事會政治關聯、客戶重要性對財務報導舞弊之影響
Impacts of Board Political Connection and Client Importance on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
(136_M5a1e6c3c85862_Full.pdf 1,399KB)

作者
劉若蘭、李旻育/臺中科技大學會計資訊系、安侯建業會計師事務所
Jo-Lan Liu, Min-Yu Li/

Department of Accounting Information, National Taichung University of Science and Technology、Department of Auditing, KPMG Taiwan Taipei Office


摘要(中文)

本研究探討董事會政治關聯以及公司對會計師的重要性,對公司發生財務報導舞弊之影響。實證結果發現,董事會具政治關聯的公司,財務報導舞弊發生率較低。受查公司對簽證會計師的重要性愈高,會因為會計師對客戶的經濟依賴效果大於聲譽維護效果,而導致財務報導舞弊發生的機率增加。由四大會計師事務所查核與公司支付審計公費較高,能降低財務報導舞弊的發生率。在公司治理變數方面,核心代理成本愈高,發生財務報導舞弊的機率愈高,而獨立董事席次比、機構投資人持股比率、董監事持股比率,能夠降低財務報導舞弊發生之風險。本研究之實證結果支持公司的董事會成員具政治關聯以及會計師事務所透過品質管制以強化會計師的獨立性,皆有助於提升公司治理品質,進而降低財務報導舞弊的風險。

(136_M5a1e6c3c85862_Abs.pdf(檔案不存在))

關鍵字(中文)

董事會政治關聯、客戶重要性、財務報導舞弊


摘要(英文)

This study examines the impacts of board political connection and client importance on fraudulent financial reporting. The empirical results reveal that firms with board political connection have lower occurrence rate of fraudulent financial reporting. However, client importance is significantly positively associated with the incidence of fraudulent reporting because the effect of economic dependence is stronger than the concerns of reputation protection for the auditors. Firms that were audited by Big-4 and paid higher fees have lower occurrence rate of fraudulent financial reporting. As to the corporate governance variables, firms with higher core agency costs have higher likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. Firms with higher percentage of independent directors on the board, institutional investor ownership, and director and supervisor ownership have lower likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. The empirical results support that having politically connected board of directors in the firm can improve corporate governance as well as having audit firms that strengthen their independence through quality control. With improved corporate governance quality, firms therefore can mitigate the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting.

(136_M5a1e6c3c85862_Abs.pdf(檔案不存在))

關鍵字(英文)

Board Political Connection, Client Importance, Fraudulent Financial Reporting


領域
Financial Accounting

政策與管理意涵

本文的實證結果,可以了解董事會成員具有政治背景等經驗,能夠盡到監督財務報導品質的責任,進而降低財務報導舞弊之發生率。會計師面對重要客戶時的經濟依賴效果大於聲譽維護效果,導致財務報導舞弊風險增加。在我國的自由民主經濟環境下,董事會成員的政治背景知識能為公司帶來好的公司治理品質,抑制不實財務報導的風險,有助於內部公司治理品質之提升。而且加強會計師的獨立性,可降低受查客戶的經濟誘因對審計品質之影響,有助於強化外部公司治理品質。公司有健全的財務狀況、充裕的現金流量,以及較低的負債比率,可減緩財務報導舞弊的發生率。降低公司的核心代理成本,減緩控制股東與小股東的利益衝突,以及強化獨立董事的功能也可降低公司發生財務報導舞弊的風險。 公司治理的課題主要為如何在公司所有者與經營者之間建構一個制衡機制,調和兩者間的利益與防範衝突發生。本文以公司曾被提起集體訴訟者作為衡量財務報導舞弊的直接證據,可補充間接衡量財務報導舞弊研究的不足,本文結果能對公司治理、財務報導舞弊等文獻提供新的實證證據,並且可供公司在尋找董監事成員時,所需具備的知識與背景,以及會計師事務所品質管制的參考依據;亦可供主管機關制定公司治理等規範之參考。


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