中山管理評論

  期刊全文閱覽

中山管理評論  2019/9

第27卷第3期  p.583-630

DOI:10.6160/SYSMR.201909_27(3).0004


題目
中國家族企業接班與政治關係對公司績效的影響
Family Firm Succession, Political Connection and Performance: Evidence from China
(144_M5d83023eecf1f_Full.pdf 875KB)

作者
翁慈青、曾家璿、鄭雨新/逢甲大學會計學系、銘傳大學會計學系、南山人壽保險股份有限公司收費管理部
Tzu-Ching Weng, Chia-Hsian Tseng, Yu-Hsin Cheng/

Department of Accounting, Feng Chia University; Department of Accounting, Ming Chuan University; Nan Shan Life Insurance Company, Premium Collection Department


摘要(中文)

本研究以2007年至2012年在中國上海、深圳交易所上市的A股為樣本,探討中國家族企業於後代接班後對公司績效之影響。以Tobin’s Q為企業績效衡量指標,實證結果發現家族企業由後代接班對其績效有負向影響。此外,本研究發現家族企業由後代接班者,若擁有政治關係則能維持較佳經營績效。若進一步將接班程度區分成完全接班或準接班,則不論接班狀態為何,政治關係都能對績效有正面影響。本研究也發現家族企業政治關係對績效之正面效果係來自於地方政府關係,在幅員廣大的中國,地區性的政治關係反而能為企業帶來實質助益。整體而言,本研究提供中國證據支持華人家族企業在後代接班後會有較差績效,而政治關係對於後代接班家族企業具有正向的中介影響。

(144_M5d83023eecf1f_Abs.pdf(檔案不存在))

關鍵字(中文)

家族企業接班、政治關係、公司績效


摘要(英文)

This study investigates the effect of succession on family firm performance by using Chinese family firms listed as A-share on Shanghai and Shenzhen exchange from 2007 to 2012. We use Tobin’s Q as our measure for corporate performance. The empirical results show that succession has a negative effect on family firm performance. In addition, we find that family firms succeeded by their heirs will have better performance if they own political connections relative to those without political connections. Dividing succession into stages of fully and quasi-succession, we find that political connection has a positive effect on family firm performance in both stages. Finally, we find that the positive relation between political connection and firm performance of family firms succeeded by their heirs comes mainly from family firms that own locally political connection. This is consistent with the fact that local connection is more useful in a huge country like China.

(144_M5d83023eecf1f_Abs.pdf(檔案不存在))

關鍵字(英文)

Family Firm Succession, Political Connection, Corporate Performance


政策與管理意涵

本研究以中國家族企業為研究對象,中國自1978年開放設立民營企業至今已40年,家族企業創辦人皆已年邁而面臨接班問題。華人家族強調家族主義與香火綿延,接班人通常是具有血緣親緣關係的家族後代,迥異於一般企業用人標準著重專業能力與經濟效能的理性思維。而中國自改革開放以來,施行具中國特色社會主義之經濟發展政策,其市場經濟係由政府主導,其經濟發展方向受政策支配,政府在中國經濟體制下有關鍵影響力。中國文化相當重視「關係」,在中國進行商業活動時,「關係」如同一項無形機制,是中國社會人與人之間往來的連結,也是遇到問題的解決方案。因此,本研究除了探討家族企業於後代接班後之績效,亦將政治關係納入考量,探討後代接班家族企業之績效是否受政治關係影響。 本研究實證結果具有以下幾點政策與管理意涵,可供我國政府、企業界與學界參考,第一,本研究發現家族企業由後代接班對企業績效普遍有負向影響,可見創辦人的管理能力、所累積經驗與社會資本不一定能完全移轉至後代接班人。由於家族企業普遍存在中國、香港、新加坡與台灣等華人社會,華人家族選才往往基於用人唯親,本研究認為華人家族企業應適時任用外部專業經理人,建立制度化管理,才能有助於企業長久發展。第二、家族企業由後代接班者,若擁有政治關係則擁有較佳的經營績效,由於中國1978年才開放民營企業,商業規則與法治制度未臻完備,且其經濟發展由政府強勢主導,因此,良好的政商關係如同商業活動與企業發展的一項無形助力,能幫助企業取得資源與優勢。第三,中國是世界第二大經濟體,為世界各國企業與台商的重要市場,歷年來中國占台商對外投資最大比重,本研究結果能增進我國政府與台商瞭解中國市場運作與文化,並提供產官學界在兩岸經貿往來及相關政策制定時參考依據。


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