本文主要探討上市櫃公司之董事會重要成員具有政治背景時，其財務報表重編之可能性相較於不具有政治背景之公司是否較高，以及發生重編事件時，公司之市場反應是否因重要成員具政治背景而有所差異。本文以大股東、最高階主管或董事成員是否擔任過中央政府官員、民意代表及相關政黨工作等特性，作為公司政治背景之替代變數。採一對一配對重編以及非重編樣本，以台灣1990年至2012年之上市櫃公司為研究對象，實證結果發現，具有政治背景之公司，較有可能發生財務報表重編；本文亦發現，具政治背景之公司發生財務報表重編，相對於無政治背景的公司市場會給予負面的反應較小。另外，將政治相關職位細分為中央政府官員、民意代表以及政黨黨職後發現，除政黨黨職之政治背景外，其餘二者都與報表重編具有顯著關係，且當公司成員之政治背景為民意代表時，公司發生重編之市場負向反應最大。最後，處理公司特質之內生問題以及刪除政府持股企業後，結果仍然一致。

This paper investigates whether the company's board member’s political connection (hereafter, PCs) is associated with the propensity of accounting restatements. Moreover, this paper also examines how market reacts to the accounting restatements of firms with PCs board. Using Taiwanese listed firms with matching sample from year 1990 to 2012, we find that if the firms are PCs, they will have higher probabilities to restate their financial reports. Besides, In contrast to non-PCs, PCs suffer from smaller market discounts as announcing restatements. Furthermore, we find that government officials and elected representatives significantly relate to the restatement of financial reports excepting for party members. Finally, after controlling for endogeneity problem and deleting firms which government owns their shares, our primary conclusion remains unchanged.

在以「關係」為基礎的華人社會，個人與商業活動大多建立在關係基礎上 (Luo & Liu, 2009)。在許多發展中的國家，像是馬來西亞、印尼、泰國等做出的相關研究結果，皆認為政治力涉入市場的自由發展，企業若在這些國家擁有政治連結關係，就表示能夠自政府獲得某些競爭優勢，或者確保稀有的資源。然而台灣目前鮮少有政治關係這方面的研究文獻，綜觀台灣的情況，經濟環境雖未完全成熟，但尚屬民主化社會，企業成員具政治關係則非少數現象。因為有這樣的現象，無論是國營或是民營企業，企業內部高階管理階層與政府有良好的互動時，可為公司在執行策略時帶來助益，協助公司獲利；然而政治連結這層特殊的關係可能使得該企業所受到的監督較為鬆散，因此公司的盈餘與財務資訊容易受到管理當局的操弄，造成盈餘品質降低，代理衝突亦較為嚴重。因此，本研究將以1990年至2012年之台灣上市上櫃公司為樣本，探討公司成員政治背景是否會影響到財務報表重編之可能性以及具有政治背景之公司發生重編事件時之市場反應。實證結果發現當董事成員具有政治關係時，公司的財務報表重編之機率愈大；然而相較於無政治關係企業而言，發生重編事件時有政治關係之企業會有較小的負向累積異常報酬。本研究更進一步將董事成員政治背景依照不同屬性區分成中央政府官員、政黨黨職及民意代表，結果發現，除了政黨黨職之背景外，無論何種政治背景之董事成員都會增加公司發生財務報表重編的機率，而擔任民意代表的董事成員影響重編的機率最為嚴重。 本研究具有下列幾點政策與管理的意涵: 1. 過去政治關係與公司治理之研究大多係以國外文獻為主，並沒有相關研究探討台灣上市櫃公司董事會政治關係與報表品質的關係。因此本文的研究結果，將可以藉此觀察台灣政治力量涉入影響財務報表品質的程度，期望幫助財務報表使用者在面對公司所提供的財務報表時，能參考相關的資訊，做出正確的判斷及決策。 2. 本研究之實證結果亦可供相關主管機關評估我國目前公司治理落實的狀況，作為擬定公司治理相關規範以提升董事會成員職能時的參考及企業組織推動獨立董事制度或提升董事會成員職能預期成效之依據。由於目前國內尚無太多相關文獻，相信本研究對後續相關之議題，應能彌補文獻之不足。 3. 本研究將政治關係董事成員區分為中央政府官員、政黨黨職與民意代表等三種不同特性之政治屬性，藉此提供資本市場參與者瞭解公司報表品質，在不同政治關係聯結下的影響程度。 4. 本研究發現有政治背景的公司重財務報表程度相對較為嚴重的情況，此結果希望提高主管機關之重視，針對受到政治力保護之企業設計一適當之監督及懲戒機制，以保護該企業之其他投資人，以此提升政治關係企業之經營效率。

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