中山管理評論

  期刊全文閱覽

中山管理評論  2015/6

第23卷第2期  p.563-590

DOI:10.6160/2015.06.02


題目
企業持有銀行股權對銀行貸款的益處:來自全球金融風暴的實證
The Benefits of Firms Holding Bank Shares on Bank Loans: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis
(117_M57e109550ee78_Full.pdf 368KB)

作者
林智勇、莊逸偉、蔡維哲、吳羽旋/元智大學管理學院暨大數據與數位匯流創新中心、國立中山大學財務管理學系、國立中山大學財務管理學系、國立台中科技大學財務金融系
Chih-Yung Lin, Yi-Wei Chuang, Wei-Che Tsai, Yu-Xuan Wu/

College of Management & Innovation Center for Big Data and Digital Convergence, Yuan Ze University; Department of Finance, National Sun Yat-sen University; Department of Finance, National Sun Yat-sen University; Department of Finance, National Taichung University of Science and Technology


摘要(中文)

本研究利用2005年到2010年台灣公司的銀行貸款合約資料,探討在金融危機間,非金融業公司能否透過持有銀行股份與放貸銀行建立關係連結,進而替公司從銀行融資上獲得優惠。研究結果顯示透過持有股權與銀行建立連結的公司相較於無此關係連結的公司,能獲得約125%的貸款額度;即使關係連結公司的違約風險較高,這些公司仍舊可獲得低於類似條件卻無關係連結公司約28.28個基點的貸款利率優惠。我們的研究結果顯示透過持有銀行股份與放貸銀行建立關係連結確實能為公司帶來好處。

(117_M57e109550ee78_Abs.pdf(檔案不存在))

關鍵字(中文)

銀行貸款、持有銀行股權、金融危機、關係人放貸


摘要(英文)

This study investigates whether firms that build connections via holding bank shares can benefit their bank loan contracts during the global financial crisis. The analysis is based on data from Taiwan (2005 to 2010). Empirical results show that the loan size of connected firms is approximately 1.25 times larger than that of firms without such connections. Connected firms can obtain 28.28 basis points lower loan rate as well, and can benefit from bank loans even if they present high default risks. Our findings provide not only support for benefits derived from relationship lending for firms but also an explanation why firms hold bank shares.

(117_M57e109550ee78_Abs.pdf(檔案不存在))

關鍵字(英文)

Bank Loans, Holding Bank Shares, Financial Crisis, Relationship Lending


政策與管理意涵

We explore the benefits that non-financial firms get from owning bank shares on bank loan contracts during the global financial crisis. Our major findings can be summarized in two-fold as follows. (1) We find that firms with bank shares can obtain favoritism from the banks on loan contracts during the global financial crisis, providing support for the notion of Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010) and Puri et al. (2011) who suggest that the bank-borrower relationship of firms can benefit their bank financing during the crisis period; (2) even under the circumstance of high default risk, we find that these connected firms still acquire favoritism in loan terms compared with non-connected firms, especially in bank loan size. Overall, our empirical results suggest that firms with holding bank shares likely benefit from bank financing during a negative exogenous shock.


參考文獻

Acharya, V. and Naqvi, H., 2012, “The Seeds of a Crisis: A Theory of Bank Liquidity and
Risk Taking Over the Business Cycle,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 106,
No. 2, 349-366.
Almeida, H. and Campello, M., 2007, “Financial Constraints, Asset Tangibility, and
Corporate Investment,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 20, No. 5, 1429-1460.
Chava, S. and Purnanandam, A., 2011, “The Effect of Banking Crisis on Bank-Dependent Borrowers,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 99, No. 1, 116-135.
Chava, S., Livdan, D., and Purnanandam, A., 2009, “Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost
of Bank Loans?” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 8, 2973-3004.
Chen, Y. S., Shen, C. H., and Lin, C. Y., 2014, “The Benefits of Political Connection:
Evidence from Individual Bank-loan Contracts,” Journal of Financial Services
Research, Vol. 45, No. 3, 287-305.
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., and Laeven, L., 2008, “Political Connections and Preferential
Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions,” Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 88, No. 3, 554-580.
Coleman, A. D. F., Esho, N., and Sharpe, I. G., 2006, “Does Bank Monitoring Influence
Loan Contract Terms?” Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 30, No. 2,
177-198.
Degryse, H. and Cayseele, P. V., 2000, “Relationship Lending within a Bank-based System:
Evidence from European Small Business Data,” Journal of Financial
Intermediation, Vol. 9, No. 1, 90-109.
Fan, J. P. H. and Wong, T. J., 2002, “Corporate Ownership Structure and the
Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia,” Journal of Accounting and
Economics, Vol. 33, No. 3, 401-425.
Farinha, L. A. and Santos, J. A. C., 2002, “Switching from Single to Multiple Bank Lending
Relationships: Determinants and Implications,” Journal of Financial
Intermediation, Vol. 11, No. 2, 124-151.
Graham, J. R., Li, S., and Qiu, J., 2008, “Corporate Misreporting and Bank Loan
Contracting,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 89, No. 1, 44-61.
Haselmann, R., Schoenherr, D., and Vig, V., 2014, “Lending in Social Networks.” Working
Paper, London Business School.
Houston, J. and James, C., 2001, “Do Relationships Have Limits? Banking Relationships,
Financial Constraints, and Investment,” Journal of Business, Vol. 74, No. 3, 347-
374.
Houston, J., Jiang, L., Lin, C., and Ma, Y., 2014, “Political Connections and the Cost of
Bank Loans,” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 52, No. 1, 193-243.
Ivashina, V. and Scharfstein, D., 2010, “Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of
2008,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 97, No. 3, 319-338.
Khwaja, A. I. and Mian, A., 2005, “Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent
Seeking in an Emerging Financial Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
120, No. 4, 1371-1411.
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., and Zamarripa, G., 2003, “Related Lending,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1, 231-268.
Laeven, L., 2001, “Insider Lending and Bank Ownership: The Case of Russia,” Journal of
Comparative Economics, Vol. 29, No. 2, 207-229.
Li, H., Meng, L., Wang, Q., and Zhou, L. A., 2008, “Political Connections, Financing and
Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms,” Journal of
Development Economics, Vol. 87, No. 2, 283-299.
Lin, C., Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., and Xuan, Y., 2011, “Ownership Structure and the Cost of
Corporate Borrowing,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 100, No. 1, 1-23.
Lu, Z., Zhu, J., and Zhang, W., 2012, “Bank Discrimination, Holding Bank Ownership, and
Economic Consequences: Evidence from China,” Journal of Banking and Finance,
Vol. 36, No. 2, 341-354.
Maurer, N. and Haber, S., 2007, “Related Lending and Economic Performance: Evidence
from Mexico,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 67, No. 3, 551-581.
Melnik, A. and Plaut, S., 1986, “Loan Commitment Contracts, Terms of Lending, and
Credit Allocation,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 41, No. 2, 425-435.
Ongena, S. and Smith, D. C., 2000, “What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships?
Cross-Country Evidence,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 9, No. 1, 26-
56.
Ongena, S. and Smith, D. C., 2001, “The Duration of Bank Relationships,” Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol. 61, No. 3, 449-475.
Petersen, M. A., 2009, “Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing
Approaches,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, 435-480.
Puri, M., Rocholl, J., and Steffen, S., 2011, “Global Retail Lending in the Aftermath of the
US Financial Crisis: Distinguishing between Supply and Demand Effects,” Journal
of Financial Economics, Vol. 100, No. 3, 556-578.
Qian, J. and Strahan, P. E., 2007, “How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts:
the Case of Bank Loans,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, No. 6, 2803-2834.
Strahan, P. E., 1999, “Borrower Risk and the Price and Nonprice Terms of Bank Loans.”
Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
White, H., 1980, “A Heteroskedasticity-consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity,” Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 4, 817-838.
Yeh, Y. H. and Woidtke, T., 2005, “Commitment or Entrenchment? Controlling
Shareholders and Board Composition,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29,
No. 7, 1857-1885.
Yen, J. F., Chen, Y. S., Shen, C. H., and Lin, C. Y., 2014, “Why Do Firms Allow Their
CEOs to Join Trade Associations? An Embeddedness View,” International Review
of Economics and Finance, Vol. 32, No. 1, 47-61.